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EDUCATION MATCH AND JOB MATCH 
Joni Hersch* 
Abstract-Using a new data set, this paper gives evidence in 
support of the intuitive notion that overqualified workers are 
less satisfied with their jobs and are more likely to quit. 
However, training time is inversely related to overqualifica- 
tion, which suggests why such seeming mismatches occur and 
may in fact be optimal. 
I. Introduction 
This paper gives evidence in support of the intuitive 
notion that overqualified workers are less satisfied with 
their jobs and are more likely to quit. However, train- 
ing time is inversely related to overqualification, which 
suggests why such seeming mismatches occur and may 
in fact be optimal. 
The definition of overqualification used in this paper 
refers to educational attainment in excess of that re- 
quired for adequate performance of the worker's job. 
This has been referred to as "surplus schooling" or 
"overeducation" by several authors (e.g., Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981); Tsang and Levin (1985); Rumberger 
(1987)). Although workers can be overqualified in a 
number of ways, educational requirements are a com- 
mon factor in most hiring decisions and are easily 
quantified. 
After discussing the relation between education and 
training, I describe the original data set used in this 
paper. Section IV presents results of wage, satisfaction, 
quit intention, and training equations. The paper con- 
cludes with suggestions for further research. 
II. Education and Training 
An important prediction of the human capital theory 
is that workers share the costs of specific on-the-job 
training by accepting a lower starting wage with a 
higher growth rate over time (Oi, 1962). This sharing 
arrangement insures both the firm and the worker 
against non-optimal turnover, and workers and firms 
will enter into a match only if they expect to reap the 
rewards of any investment in specific training over 
time. If ability and education are positively correlated, 
training costs are likely to be inversely related to overe- 
ducation, and many combinations of education attain- 
ment and probability of turnover will yield the same 
expected return to the firm. 
Further, not all jobs require large investments in 
firm-specific training. The primary cost of turnover in 
this case is hiring costs. Since education is a highly 
visible indicator of work quality, employers screening 
workers for jobs which do not require specific training 
may find the cheapest screen is the worker's education.1 
In addition, overeducated workers may constitute a 
pool from which promotions are made, thereby reduc- 
ing hiring costs for higher level jobs. 
Individuals investing in education do so in expecta- 
tion of receiving a return high enough to compensate 
them for the costs of their investment. Since education 
and earnings are highly correlated, workers will seek 
jobs whose educational requirement match their edu- 
cational attainment. However, job search is costly and 
workers may optimize by accepting an offer for a job 
which requires less education than they possess. These 
workers may continue searching for a better match and 
therefore may have higher turnover. Since turnover 
will be less costly in jobs with low investment in firm- 
specific capital, we expect workers with a mismatch in 
education to be in jobs with a low specific training 
component. 
III. Data and Empirical Specification 
This paper uses original data collected in the Eu- 
gene, Oregon area in 1986. The sample was drawn 
from employees of eighteen manufacturing and ware- 
house firms, excluding firms in the highly cyclical forest 
products industry. I selected manufacturing and ware- 
houses since workers and jobs in these industries are 
similar, and there is significant worker mobility across 
these industries. 
To generate the sample, all manufacturing firms and 
warehouses in the area with more than forty employees 
were asked to participate in the study. Eighteen firms 
participated in the study, representing 50% of the 
eligible firms. Worker information was collected by 
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posting notices informing workers that a researcher 
would be in the employee lunchroom at particular 
times, i.e., between shifts or during break or meal- 
times, and employees who completed a twenty-minute 
questionnaire would be paid $5.00 for their time. All 
respondents were guaranteed confidentiality, with no 
names requested on the questionnaire. 
The sample I examine consists of 414 male and 213 
female employees. The key variables in this study are 
the education variables, job satisfaction, quit inten- 
tions, and on-the-job training, described below. 
To obtain data on the incidence of educational mis- 
match, workers were asked "What level of formal 
education do you feel is actually needed by a person to 
do your job, not just to be hired?" This question was 
followed by a choice of six categories ranging from "no 
formal education is necessary" to post-college educa- 
tion.2 In order to construct a continuous measure of 
surplus schooling I converted each category to a single 
school-year equivalent.3 Actual schooling is measured 
as number of years of completed schooling. Surplus or 
deficit schooling is defined as the absolute value of the 
difference between actual schooling and that required 
to perform the job. On average, actual education ex- 
ceeds reported required education, although 21% of 
the women and 14% of the men report having less 
education than their jobs require. 
SATISFACTION is measured on a linear scale from 
zero to ten, where zero represents "not at all satisfied" 
and ten represents "very satisfied." Workers were 
asked to circle the value that best reflects their job 
satisfaction. QUIT INTENTION is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the worker responded that he or she is 
"very" or "somewhat likely" to make a genuine effort 
to find a new job with another employer within the 
next twelve months. On-the-job training (TRAINING) 
is the response to the question "Did the company 
provide any on-the-job training?' If yes, how many 
weeks?"4 
Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the educa- 
tion variables and of the average values of SATISFAC- 
TION, QUIT INTENTION, and TRAINING by occu- 
pation and sex. Educational attainment and require- 
ments were highest for professional and managerial 
workers, and lowest for operatives and laborers. The 
percentage of workers with surplus education ranged 
from 29% for female clerical and sales workers to 78% 
for female operatives. The incidence of surplus educa- 
tion by occupation is similar to that reported by Rum- 
berger (1987) using the Quality of Employment Surveys. 
There is strong evidence of a negative relation between 
percentage of workers with surplus schooling and aver- 
age satisfaction, and a strong positive relation between 
percentage of workers with surplus schooling and quit 
intentions. The average amount of training provided by 
occupation also varies inversely with the percentage of 
workers with surplus schooling. Section IV demon- 
strates that these relations also hold for individuals 
after controlling for detailed human capital character- 
istics and wage. 
Table 2 summarizes the variable definitions and sam- 
ple characteristics for male and female workers. The 
other independent variables used in the analysis are 
years of full-time work experience since age 18, years 
of tenure with current employer, dummy variables equal 
to one for workers that are handicapped, white, mar- 
ried, or in a job covered by a union contract, as well as 
dummy variables for five occupational categories. 
IV. Empirical Results 
The first column of table 3 summarizes the results of 
the estimation of a standard human capital wage equa- 
tion for the male and female samples (complete regres- 
sion results are available on request). The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wage. In 
2Although the interpretation of "required education" can 
be problematic, none of the respondents indicated that they 
had any difficulty in responding to this question. 
3 To examine the sensitivity of the results to the conversion 
used, I estimated all models using three different conversion 
schemes. For instance, for workers reporting their job re- 
quired "some college" I estimated the model assigning the 
school year equivalent as 13, 14, and 15 years. The results 
presented in the paper are based on the middle values for all 
categories. The results varied little with the conversion scheme 
used. The results are less sensitive to the conversion scheme 
than those based on the Quality of Employment Surveys (QES), 
where both actual and required schooling are measured in 
categories. Data from the QES have been used extensively, 
particularly in studies addressing job risk and working condi- 
tions. Rumberger (1987) discusses these data. The 1976 Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) also has a question on 
required education. However, the PSID question refers to the 
amount of education needed to be hired. This will affect 
match quality less directly than the amount of education the 
worker feels is necessary to do the job. 
4 The 1976 PSID and the QES have training questions 
which ask the respondent how long it would take the average 
new person to become fully trained and qualified (PSID) or to 
do the job reasonably well (QES). We would not expect the 
training time necessary for the average worker to depend on 
the education match of the individual worker. As with the 
PSID and QES training variables, the measure of training in 
this paper may be subject to considerable measurement error, 
since most of the employers in the sample did not provide 
formal training programs. Workers tended to be trained infor- 
mally by their supervisor and coworkers. However, the pattern 
of responses (reported in table 1) conforms to conventional 
expectations and is also consistent with tabulations based on 
the length of time required by the average new worker to 
learn a job reported in Duncan and Hoffman (1979) using the 
PSID. 
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TABLE 1. -MEANS OF EDUCATION AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
BY OCCUPATION AND SEX 
Percent 
No. of Education Education Surplus Quit 
Observations Attainment Requirement Education Satisfaction Intention OJT 
Males 
Professional 
and 
Managerial 56 15.51 14.46 .52 7.41 .34 3.35 
Clerical 
and Sales 23 15.17 13.30 .70 6.35 .52 4.69 
Craftsmen 
and 
Foremen 113 12.79 11.98 .36 6.57 .41 21.16 
Operatives 114 12.57 11.09 .52 6.31 .40 9.35 
Laborers 108 13.18 10.17 .72 5.61 .63 4.13 
Females 
Professional 
and 
Managerial 26 13.98 13.54 .35 7.35 .35 6.35 
Clerical 
and Sales 104 13.11 12.90 .29 7.30 .30 3.61 
Craftsmen 
and 
Foremen 11 12.36 10.55 .36 7.91 .09 40.05 
Operatives 27 12.22 10.00 .78 6.02 .59 6.71 
Laborers 45 12.56 9.07 .73 5.24 .56 2.76 
TABLE 2.-VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SAMPLE MEANS 
(STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES) 
Variable Definition Males Females 
WAGE = hourly wage. 9.99 7.54 
(4.05) (2.81) 
SATISFACTION = ranking of job satisfaction on 6.35 6.74 
a scale of 0 to 10 from not at (2.49) (2.61) 
all satisfied to very satisfied 
QUIT INTENTION = 1 if worker is somewhat or very 0.46 0.38 
likely to make a genuine effort (0.50) (0.49) 
to change employment in the next 
12 months; 0 otherwise 
OJT = weeks of company provided 10.13 6.15 
on-the-job training (31.19) (19.36) 
EDUCATION = years of schooling completed 13.33 12.95 
(2.07) (1.58) 
REQUIRED = years of schooling needed to 11.67 11.68 
EDUCATION perform the job, not just to be (2.60) (2.71) 
hired 
EXPERIENCE = years of full-time work 14.59 12.16 
experience since age 18 (11.03) (9.58) 
TENURE = years of tenure with present 7.33 5.42 
employer (7.14) (5.93) 
HANDICAPPED = 1 if physical condition limits 0.07 0.08 
work; 0 otherwise (0.26) (0.27) 
WHITE = 1 if worker is white; 0.95 0.94 
0 otherwise (0.21) (0.23) 
MARRIED = 1 if married; 0 otherwise 0.72 0.57 
(0.45) (0.50) 
UNION = 1 if worker's job is covered by 0.33 0.35 
a union contract; 0 otherwise (0.47) (0.48) 
Sample size 414 213 
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TABLE 3.-ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF EDUCATIONAL MISMATCH ON WAGES, 
JOB SATISFACTION, QUIT INTENTION, AND OJT 
Dependent Variable 
Ln (WAGE)a SATISFACTIONb QUITINTENTIONC OJTd 
Males 
REQUIRED EDUCA TION .061i .066 
(.008) (.063) 
SURPLUS EDUCATION .023f -.3l5' .116e -1.648e 
(.008) (.061) (.053) (0.739) 
DEFICIT EDUCA TION - .006 .051 - .099 0.556 
(.021) (.165) (.184) (2.596) 
EDUCATION .030 1.599 
(.066) (1.050) 
WAGE .073e - .129f 
(.037) (.043) 
Adj R2 or .58 .25 0.08 
Likelihood Ratio 485.45 
Females 
REQUIRED EDUCATION .064f .206 
(.012) (.107) 
SURPLUS EDUCATION .022 -.369f .109 - l.749' 
(.014) (.119) (.078) (0.669) 
DEFICIT EDUCA TION - .035 - .466e .003 - 0.469 
(.027) (.227) (.249) (1.880) 
EDUCATION .009 0.714 
(.112) (0.984) 
WAGE .077 -.256f 
(.068) (.086) 
Adj R2 or .45 .27 .17 
Likelihood Ratio 230.68 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
d Equation also included the variables EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE SQUARED, TENURE, TENURE 
SQUARED, HANDICAPPED, WHITE, MARRIED, and UNION. 
b Equation also included the variables EXPERIENCE, TENURE, HANDICAPPED, WHITE, MARRIED, and 
UNION. 
c Estimated using maximum likelihood logit. Equation also included the variables EXPERIENCE, TENURE, 
HANDICAPPED, WHITE, MARRIED, and UNION. 
dEquation also included years of precompany experience, HANDICAPPED, WHITE, MARRIED, and UNION 
and controls for five occupational categories. 
e Significant at the 0.05 level (two-sided tests). 
f Significant at the 0.01 level (two-sided tests). 
addition to the education and wage variables reported 
in this table, the wage equations include years of work 
experience and its square, years of tenure with current 
employer and its square, and dummy variables for 
handicapped status, race, marital status, and union 
status. To allow the return to years of surplus educa- 
tion and years of deficit education to differ, the vari- 
ables SURPLUS and DEFICIT are both included in 
the specification. (Note that although DEFICIT + 
SURPLUS + REQUIRED EDUCATION sum to EDU- 
CATION, there is no problem with multicollinearity 
because total education is omitted from equations with 
deficit, surplus, and required education.) The relatively 
high explanatory power is due in part to the fact that 
since all workers were employed in the same locality, 
regional and city size differences in the earnings struc- 
ture were absent. 
The returns to required schooling are about 6% for 
both men and women, while the return to surplus 
schooling is slightly less than half that amount. Having 
less education than required to do one's job does not 
have a significant effect on wage. These values are 
similar to those found by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) 
and Rumberger (1987). 
The second column of table 3 summarizes the results 
of the estimation of the job satisfaction equation, where 
satisfaction is regressed on required, surplus, and deficit 
equation, as well as the remaining human capital and 
individual characteristics. Both male and female work- 
ers with too much education for their jobs are less 
satisfied (significant at the 5% level in two-sided tests), 
as are women with too little education. Satisfaction is 
not significantly related to required schooling. Workers 
with higher wages are more satisfied; however, this 
result is significant only for men. 
Column 3 of table 3 summarizes the logit estimates 
of the QUIT INTENTION equation. Since workers 
who change jobs often do so in response to higher 
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outside wage offers, and actual years of schooling are a 
more important determinant of outside wage offers 
than the level of schooling required in a worker's 
current job, the variable QUIT INTENTION is re- 
gressed on surplus, deficit, and actual years of school- 
ing as well as the remaining human capital and individ- 
ual characteristics. The expressed likelihood of quitting 
is positively related to the number of years of surplus 
schooling for men (significant at the 5% level in a 
two-sided test), and is significantly negatively related to 
hourly wage for both men and women. Thus men with 
surplus education are more likely to expect to receive 
an outside offer that exceeds their current wage. How- 
ever, the likelihood of receiving a higher outside wage 
offer is inversely related to current wage.5 
The last column of table 3 summarizes the estimates 
of the regression of TRAINING on years of individual 
education, surplus education, deficit education, years 
of precompany experience, and dummy variables for 
handicapped, race, marital status, and union status, 
and occupation category. Training time is significantly 
negatively related to years of surplus schooling for both 
males and females. An additional year of surplus 
schooling reduces training time by 1.65 weeks for males 
and 1.75 weeks for females. However, workers who 
have less education than their jobs require do not 
receive significantly more training. Actual education is 
not significantly related to training time. 
Finding an inverse relation between training time 
and the quantity of surplus schooling provides a ratio- 
nale for hiring overqualified workers. Whether this 
inverse relation is due to greater innate ability of 
workers with surplus education, or the result of firms 
providing less training to workers they anticipate will 
be more likely to quit, the costs of turnover may be 
lower for overqualified workers.6 
V. Suggestions for Further Research 
Underlying these empirical findings is a model of 
employer and employee search in which turnover is an 
anticipated and optimal outcome of hiring overquali- 
fied workers. The next stage is to model the employer 
and employee search decisions incorporating these fea- 
tures: hiring costs are a function of educational attain- 
ment, training is a function of educational match, and 
workers can search while employed. One testable pre- 
diction of such a model is that, by searching while 
employed, workers move into better matching jobs, 
which supports the empirical finding that eventually 
workers move into jobs with ultimately long duration 
(Hall, 1982). 
DATA APPENDIX 
I personally collected the data by on-site visits and by 
interviews with a representative of the firm for 12 of the firms, 
while my research assistant collected the data for the remain- 
ing 6 firms. The information provided by the firm's represen- 
tative included information on turnover, methods used by the 
firm to find applicants for job openings, methods of determin- 
ing pay raises and promotions, types of training programs 
used, fringe benefits, overtime policies, information on days 
lost due to on-the-job accidents, information on sales, produc- 
tion capacity, and union contract. I also obtained additional 
detailed information for each firm on claims for on-the-job 
accidents from the State of Oregon Workers Compensation 
Department. I did not have access, however, to individual 
personnel records. 
The data do not represent a random sample, either of firms 
or of workers within firms. However, the firms and the work- 
ers seem to be representative of the population of firms and 
workers in the Eugene area. The firms that declined to 
participate primarily did so because summer was their peak 
time, the company president was not available to grant per- 
mission (e.g., on vacation or too busy) or because the firm did 
its own in-house surveys and did not want their workers 
burdened by additional surveys (doubtlessly, a secondary rea- 
son was that they wished to avoid establishing a precedent of 
paying workers for completing a survey). 
The extent of worker participation varied with the involve- 
ment of the individual firm. About half of the firms gave 
workers time off from work to complete the survey, and for 
these firms most of the workers present participated. In the 
other firms, the surveys were administered uring break times, 
lunch, or before and after work and between shifts. The rate 
of participation in these cases was lower, but there appeared 
to be no systematic reason for not participating. Reasons for 
not participating generally were related to previous commit- 
ments. 
5Estimations including SATISFACTION in the QUIT IN- 
TENTION equation indicate that more satisfied workers are 
less likely to quit. 
6 The actual costs of turnover depend on a number of 
unobserved factors, particularly actual training and hiring 
costs. 
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